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Leveraged Buyouts:
Opportunities and Risks
by
Elisa S. Moncarz
Associate Professor
School of Hospitality Management
Florida International University

This article presents a general overview of leveraged buyouts, relating their
feasibility as an option for hospitality management. Specifically, the author
explores the background and main features of leveraged buyouts, focusing attention on their risks and rewards, management's opportunities, tax
ramifications, planning, and future outlook. Denny's leveraged buyout is
examined in order to provide an insight into the structuring of a buyout for
a major food service firm.

Leveraged buyouts have received increased attention as a business
strategy in the past few years. They have become "one of the most
successful and certainly most creative ways to purchase corporate
assets,"' and have been described by some observers as the corporate
trend of the '80s, providing a unique opportunity for management to
own and operate a business.
Although the hospitality industry has not actively participated in
the leveraged buyout boom, the recent execution of the buyouts of
Denny's, I n c and ARA Services, Inc leads to speculation on the likelihood that leveraged buyouts might become a trend in the hospitality
industry. Surely, "the Denny's deal is the first big test of whether the
restaurant industry can participate successfully in leveraged buyouts."*
A leveraged buyout (LBO), also called management buyout, occurs
when a private consortium of management, investment bankers, and
institutional investors borrows money to purchase a company from public shareholders or from a parent company. "By using mainly borrowed
funds and putting a little of their own equity, managers are entering
the world of entrepreneurship."3 In a LBO the investor group that
includes the management of the company to be acquired takes the company private in a transaction largely financed by borrowings. Ultimately, the debt is repaid with funds generated by the acquired
company's operations or the sale of assets.
"A well conceived, planned and executed leveraged buyout can give
an opportunity for significant capital appreciation in a relatively short
period of time114When it works, it pays off handsomely for all concerned. While entrepreneurial executives obtain a chance to own a company, stockholders are paid a premium for their shares, and deal
organizers get fees and a share of profits.
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As previously noted, LBOs are heavily financed with debt. Financial institutions and other outside sources typically provide between
70 and 90 percent of the purchase price. Equity contributions are normally kept low to achieve the greater upside appreciation and return
on investment. 'The net effect is that debt is used to retire equity, which
is known as leveraging up a company's capitalization.115"It is not unusual
for the debt to equity ratio of a company to be more than 10 to 1after
a LB01'6 A leveraged takeover (or institutional buyout) is distinguished
from a leveraged buyout in that in a takeover the company is acquired
by a group of professional investors who are outsiders, whereas in a
leveraged buyout certain members of management acquire the company, division, or subsidiary they are currently managing.
LBOs Are Not New Phenomenon

Although LBOs have been receiving a considerable amount of attention lately, the leveraged buyout concept has been around for over 20
years when it was known as "b~otstrapping.~'
General Electric Credit
Corporation has been a main purveyor of financing for LBOs for the
past 20 years, and has thus been regarded as a pioneer in this area.
Prudential Insurance Company has also been involved in LBOs since
the early '60s.
Opportunities became abundantly apparent for LBOs in the latter
half of the '60s when the conglomerates found themselves flooded with
acquisitions. Often they wished to sell pieces of the larger companies
they acquired in order to improve group, divisional, or company structures. The first investment banking firm to take notice of the potential rewards of LBOs was Gibbsons, Green and Rice. In 1976, Kohlberg,
Kravis, Roberts and Company was formed and became "the undisputed
leader in the fieldyy7
of LBO specialists. Until 1979 most of the LBO
deals were valued a t less than $100,000 and thus were too small to
be of interest to large investment banking firms. By 1982, however,
the total LBO deals amounted to $2.4 billion, accounting for 13 percent of all corporate divestitures. As a result, many investment banks
began to notice the LBO boom and opened separate departments dedicated to providing assistance and planning for LBOs.
Over the past few years, "a vigorous economic recovery, combined
with relatively low interest and inflation rates and increasing corporate
cash flow and liquidity, has encouraged a rising tide of leveraged buyouts.ll* In the period from January 1to October 12, 1984, there were
62 LBOs amounting to $13.5 billion, compared to 30 LBOs amounting to $6 billion in the same period in 1983, according to Securities
Data.
Buyouts Require The Restructuring Of Corporate Ownership

A major feature of a LBO is that the equity capital (ownership) is
shared between the managers and the outside investors who help
finance the acquisition of publicly-held stock. The great appeal to the
investor-manager is that he or she changes from an employee to an
entrepreneur.
Qpically, an investment firm engineers the deal by putting together
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the buying group, which is comprised of outside investors and certain
members of the company's management. The investor group is
interested in purchasing the company with little equity and a great
deal of debt, secured by the company's assets. The idea is to complete
the buyout with funds raised from pledging or selling existing assets
of the purchased company.
Financing for an LBO is often complex and many-faceted. Banks
and insurance companies provide the bulk of the required debt financing. They generally require assets such as property and equipment,
inventories, or receivables as collateral for their loans. Due to the risk
factor, loans are offered in significant excess over prime rate, often
through bridge financing and remortgaging. Other financing sources
include small business investment companies, venture capitalists, federal and state government agencies, and employee stock ownership
plans. Also, pension funds have provided a considerable amount of
equity capital for buyout deals.
Immediately after the buyout is completed, there is a restructuring
of corporate ownership by replacing the entire public stock interest
with full equity ownership by the private investor group. Managers
will generally share subsequent equity ownership with outside private
investors who helped finance the LBO.
The return to private ownership (going private) "potentially yields
material reductions in registrations, listing, and other stockholder servicing cost^."^ Private companies have more freedom in their decisionmaking process. "Business decisions are addressed solely from their
economic viewpoint without regard to the potential impact on earnings per sharel'10 Implicit in this argument is that once private, the
company can manage its business in its best long-term interests rather
than on the short-run orientation of the stock market. That is, without public shareholders, managers are able to concentrate more on
long-term goals.
Frequently LBOs are structured as mergers. In that event, the public firm is usually combined with a shell corporation created expressly
for the purpose of going private. "Under the merger agreement the
stockholders of the shell corporation (the incumbent management
group) become the sole equity owners of the surviving firm. The public stockholders must surrender their shares and receive cash in return.
Stockholders of the public firm must vote to approve the merger."ll
If the buyout turns out to be a successful venture, the company can
retire the debt within five to 10 years. The investor group can then
realize large returns by reselling the company, In many instances, "the
company goes public again, sometimes scoring a second success in the
new issues market."12 I t is not unreasonable to expect annual returns
of 40 or 50 percent. In extraordinary cases, larger returns have been
achieved.
Prime Ingredients For Successful LBOs

LBOs are not suitable for all types of companies. Promising candidates for LBOs among hospitality firms will share many of the following characteristics:
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Strong and competent management team expected to stay once
the transaction is completed. Essentially, continuity of management has been regarded as a basic ingredient for a successful LBO.
High cash generators, thereby facilitating the repayment of the
new debt.
Limited outstanding debt which permits the addition of significant additional borrowings.
Undervalued assets which also allow the payment of a premium
to selling shareholders and a purchase at a reasonable price.
Stable earnings growth. Although the company does not need to
be highly profitable, it must have some fundamental strength to
build on so that competent management will be able to comfortably service the debt.
It is crucial to maintain earnings at projected levels during the period
of time that it will take to bring the debt ratio to a more manageable
position. Ideal candidates for LBOs are undervalued companies that
have low debt, large and steady cash flows, and prospects for stable
earnings growth.
The key in identifying potential opportunities for LBOs in the hospitality industry requires a full appreciation of the reasons why a company or division is being sold or divested. The main circumstances in
which LBOs arise are:
Public companies that are trading at prices below their net asset
values. Management-investors take the company private in a LBO.
Indeed, the most difficult LBO is taking a public company private
because of the shareholders' concern for receiving a fair price.
Divestitures of divisions that no longer fit the corporate strategies of the public companies that own them. Management wants
to divest resources by spinning off unwanted divisions.
Private companies in which the owner is near retirement (or perhaps intends to pursue other interests).
Situations in which there is a threat of hostile takeover attempts.
Instances in which the board of directors might be frustrated with
dissident shareholders.
LBOs Have Tax Advantages
A favored aspect of LBOS is their current tax treatment. Actually,
"Uncle Sam has subsidized the leveraged buyout business"13 through
liberalized depreciation rules included in the tax code. Most LBOs pay
little or no income taxes in the first few years after conversion as a
result of the increased depreciation charges based on the new higher
book value of the assets written up. Also, the interest on the borrowed
money, in contrast to dividends, is tax deductible and thus shelters
earnings.
Since private companies are not required to report earnings for public
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shareholders, they can make the fullest use of the liberalized depreciation deductions included in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
as recently amended. The augmented cash flow derived from the tax
savings can then be used to service and retire the large debt incurred
during the buyout.
A recent provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (TRA) provides
an added tax incentive affecting LBOs. According to TRA, "banks and
other commercial lenders will be able to exclude from taxable income
50 percent of the income received on loans to Employees Stock Options
Plans (ESOP)1'14 These lenders are expected to pass on some of these
tax savings to the ESOP, thereby encouraging a new form of LBO
by making these plans an inexpensive way to finance the buyout.
Management Opportunities Exist

LBOs provide a unique opportunity for talented managers to own
and operate the business they are currently managing. Experts have
indicated that this opportunity might result in "the revitalization of
the chief executive by becoming a mature entrepreneur."15
Entrepreneurs often take a different view of the world of professional managers. They have stronger beliefs in property rights and
in managing for the long term. "Entrepreneurial managers can make
small units grow more rapidly and take advantages of market niches.1116
The whole emphasis is on management involvement and motivation
since owner-managers stand to benefit more. They become more committed, deriving increased productivity for the company. Experience
also indicates that buyouts enable managers to be compensated in ways
that would be quite difficult to carry out in a publicly-owned company.
The likelihood of receiving "bonus plans that give managers as much
as 100 percent of company profits above some target profit figure may
also yield strong productivity gains for some companies."17
Moreover, productivity gains can also be achieved because "LBOs
replace passive public investors with sophisticated institutional investors who have strong financial interest in the future profitability of
the c~mpany."'~
These institutional investors will normally monitor
the operation of the private company following the buyout through
representation on the board of directors.
LBOs Do Have Risks

LBOs have been very attractive for all parties involved as a result
of the prospects for spectacular returns. For investors putting equity
money into buyouts, returns on investments of over 40 percent have
not been uncommon. While allowing corporate managers to become
corporate owners, selling shareholders usually receive a generous
premium above the current market value of their stock. At the same
time, deal organizers receive hefty fees and a percentage of profits.
Buyouts have also helped some corporations shed unwanted divisions
for premium prices.
Still, despite the potential for impressive returns, LBOs involve substantial risk. Once the LBO is completed, the company is deep in debt.
"The greater the leverage, the greater the risks to the company, its
shareholders, and ~ r e d i t o r s . ~The
" ~ risk is further magnified "when
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debt is short-term and tied to prime rate fluctuations as is much of
the debt provided in LBO situation^."^^ Rvo unknowns can jeopardize
the company's existence: an economy downturn and a significant rise
in interest rates. "A movement of 3 to 4 points in the prime rate or
a credit squeeze may be enough to place the future of a marginal LBO
in je~pardy."~'
Recently, government officials have expressed concern about the
undue risks of LBOs by voicing their warnings and questioning their
wisdom. Paul A. Volcker, chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank,
warned in June 1984 that "LBO transactions could give the acquired
company excessive debt," placing too heavy a demand on cash flows.
Similarly, SEC chairman John Shad warned "the more leveraged
takeovers and buyouts today, the more bankruptcies tomorrow0 Once
a company has balanced the rewards and risks associated with LBOs
and decided to follow the LBO route, certain steps need to be
implemented in planning a successful plan of action:
Perform sufficient modeling of alternative interest rates and business conditions in order to evaluate the chances of success.
Analyze accounting and tax consequences.
Exercise extreme caution in the selection of professionals, which
should include:
lawyers: They will play a key role in structuring acquisition and
debt agreements and in the negotiating process.
accountants: They will provide tax advice and will assist in the
preparation and analysis of financial statements.
investment bankers: Those experienced in LBOs will provide
advice and assistance in obtaining financing.
appraisers: They will assist in the determination of the collateral
value of property and equipment.
The main objective to keep in mind is to structure a financing package that not only enables the buyout, but also permits adequate cash
flow to fund current and future operating needs.
Future Outlook For LBOs

Despite the recent LBO boom, it appears that LBOs have cooled down
a bit after reaching a peak in 1984. Lenders and investors have become
more wary of buyouts, making it more difficult to raise money and
line up investors. Also, many LBOs have become overpriced; hence the
economies of these deals might no longer be acceptable for investors.
LBOs have been subject to criticism from government officials and
others about their undue risks as well as management's gains coming
at the expense of public shareholders. This latter contention was disproved by a recent study conducted by Harry deAngelo, Linda
deAngelo, and Edward Rice, which concluded that buyouts are rather
beneficial to public shareholders. The study revealed that in a typical
situation, the public shareholders' offer "involved a price that was 56
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percent above the market value prior to the initial offer."22
Another issue that might affect the future environment for LBOs
is the role that buyouts are expected to play as a defensive maneuver
to halt an all-time high hostile takeover trend. To this end, "there are
definite signs that LBOs may soon form the arsenal of standard defense
measures that have been dreamed by investment banks to replace
unfriendly bidders,"23better known as corporate raiders. Future trends
are clearly toward the continuation of LBOs as long as the potential
for substantial wealth remains a strong incentive for all participants.
The tax system is also expected to preserve the favored treatment of
LBOs, encouraging their future growth. Further, conglomerates are
divesting themselves of unwanted units, "offering them to their
managers a s part of the unwinding of the merger and acquisition craze
of the past decade."24This provides a unique opportunity for the hospitality industry since some conglomerates are currently re-evaluating
their commitments to food service chains and some have publicly
announced their plans to sell their food service divisions.
Denny's, Inc. Has Buyout

Denny's, Inc has been engaged in the food service business primarily through the development, management, and operation of full-service
restaurants (coffee-shop division), donut houses (Winchell's division),
and quick service, Mexican-style, char-broiled chicken restaurants (El
Pollo Loco division). Denny's sales volume had placed it in first place
in the coffee shop and family restaurant segment, significantly ahead
of other competitors.
On January 24, 1985, Denny's shareholders approved an LBO offer
of $43 a share (or about $734.2 million) at a special meeting of shareholders in La Mirada, California, "a transaction that is of a magnitude unprecedented in the food service industry."25
Originally proposed by Merrill Lynch Capital Markets (Merrill
in May 1984 after being consulted by Denny's on the feasibility of disposing of its Winchell's Donut Houses division,27the Denny's
LBO was expected to be finalized in three to five months. However,
the private investor group led by Merrill Lynch was unable to line up
all the required financing to support the original offer of $45 a share,
delaying the consummation of the buyout until January 1985. At the
same time, "the price to be paid to Denny's shareholders was cut to
$43 a share from $45 a share,"28 resulting in a reduction in the value
of the LBO deal to $734.2 million from $787 million.
The Denny's buyout was structured as a merger in which a whollyowned subsidiary of a Delaware-based holding company named DH129
merged into Denny's. "As a result of the merger, Denny's would become
a wholly owned subsidiary of the new privately held company - DHI,
principally owned by certain members of Denny's management, by Merrill Lynch, and by other financial institutions," according to proxy material sent t o Denny's shareholders in advance of the special meeting
of January 24, 1985, to vote on the proposal.
The private investor group was comprised of 55 members of Denny's
senior management led by its president and chief executive officer Vern
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0 . Curtis and by Merrill Lynch and unaffiliated investors. The 55 members of Denny's management team who participated in the LBO
"acquired 18 percent of Denny's by combining $6.6 million from tax
free swaps of stock options and cashing in accumulated performance
bonuses'130when in fact their own cash investment was only $1.5 million. "Although management's $8.1 million investment accounted for
18 percent of the company's common stock, it represented $132 mil~~
for
lion of the $734.2 million value of the t r a n s a c t i ~ n ~a "potential
a sizeable return on investment should the company go public a t some
point in the future.
Individually, Vern 0. Curtis became the biggest management shareholder with a 3 percent stake in the company after an investment of
$1.2 million. On May 25, 1984, the last full day of trading prior to public
announcement of the proposed LBO, "the reported closing price on
the New York Exchange (NYSE) composite tape was $32 518 per share
of Denny's common
On September 25, 1984, the last full day
of trading prior to public announcement of the decline of the original
offer price to $43 a share, "the reported closing price on the NYSE
On
composite tape was $38 per share of Denny's common
December 21, 1984, the day the proxy statement was mailed to shareholders to vote on the merger, "the reported closing price on the NYSE
composite tape was $41 314 per share of Denny's common s t 0 ~ k . l ' ~ ~
Denny's Was Well-Suited For Buyout

Denny's was considered to be well-suited for a buyout among restaurant companies because "it had more than $100 million in cash and
generated strong cash flows needed to pay off the debt that is the result
of the
Besides, Denny's was a conservative company among
food service concerns with an attractive record of quality and consistency in earnings.
Denny's was an extremely well-managed operation, which had
experienced tremendous expansion and increased profitability over the
past several years. Analysts perceived Denny's management team as
one of the most competent and respected in the restaurant industry.
Its operational and financial controls were considered among the best.
Denny's was very strong financially. Its debt as a percentage of total
assets was a reasonable 55 percent and it was a highly liquid firm.
The book value per share of Denny's common stock was $19.44 on June
29, 1984, which was seen as an indication of undervalued assets. A
special committee of Denny's board of directors that evaluated the fairness of the $43 per share price paid to Denny's selling shareholders
indicated that the aforementioned price provided these shareholders
with an opportunity to receive cash for current investment at a higher
rate of return than Denny's historical dividend yields.
Obviously, the most significant amount of funds required to finance
the buyout came from borrowings, and thus reflected a major increase
to Denny's debt load of $568.2 million. (See Exhibit 1).The main portion of debt financing was supplied by Morgan Guaranty of New York
and Wells Fargo Bank, providing $372.6 million at one point over prime
rate and $118.7 million at 2.5 points over prime rate (as defined) in
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the form of revolving credit loans and subordinated floating rate notes
due a t various times through 1997. In addition, Prudential Insurance
Company provided $60.5 million a t 15.5 percent and $16.4 million a t
16.75 percent for senior and subordinated fixed rate notes. The balance of the capital needed to finance the Denny's LBO was received
from the investor group led by Merrill Lynch and from Denny's accumulated cash balances. For its part, the consortium led by Merrill Lynch
invested in $35.6 million of preferred stock paying 13 percent dividends
and purchased 77 percent of the $44.4 million common stock outstanding. Denny's profit sharing plan also invested in 5 percent of the common stock outstanding.
A breakdown of the ownership interest (common stcck investment)
with respect to Denny's LBO transaction follows:

Exhibit 1
Denny's Leveraged Buyout:
Sources and Uses of Funds
In Millions of Dollars
Sources of funds
Debt Financing:
Revolving credit loans
15.5% senior fixed rate notes
Subordinated floating rate loans
16.75% subordinated fixed rate notes
Total debt financing
Equity Financing:
DHI redeemable preferred stock
DHI common stock
Total equity
Denny's existing cash balances
Total sources

Uses of funds
Payment to Denny's shareholders ($43 a share)
Payment of fees and expenses incurred in
connection with the merger
Total uses

NCYI'E:

All the outstanding capital stock of Denny's and substantially of its wholly-owned
subsidiaries were pledged to secure the payment of the principal and interest relating to the debt portion of the financing.

SOURCE: Denny's Proxy Statement, December 21, 1984.
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A breakdown of the investments is as follows:
Amount in Percent
millions of
dollars

Denny's management group
Merrill Lynch consortium
Profit sharing plan

$ 8.1
34.1

18.2Y0
76.8

LBOs involve enormous risk for all involved, and Denny's appears
to be no exception. Denny's buyers added over $560 million of debt
to the company's capitalization, which resulted in raising the debt burden to about $792.5 million. Since the buyout also decreased the equity
base to about $44 million from $312 million, Denny's debt to equity
ratio was raised from less than 1 to 1 to the excessive level of 18 to
1 (see Exhibit 2).

Exhibit 2
Denny's Leveraged Buyout
Impact on Capitalization
In Millions of Dollars
Denny's
9/28/84'

Denny's LBO
9/28/84
Proforma2

Long-term debt3
Long-term notes
Convertible debentures4
Obligations under capital leases
Revolving credit loans
Senior Fixed Rate Notes
Subordinated Floating Rate Loans
Subordinated Fixed Rate Notes
lbtal Long-term debt
Preferred Stock
Common Shareholders' Equity
Total Capitalization
Debt to equity ratio
1.

2.
3.
4.

The quarter ending September 28, 1984, was Denny's last full reporting period before it
went private.
Proforma capitalization figures give effect to the execution of the leverage buyout pursuant
to the terms of merger and financing. They also give effect to the sale of the rights to the
Denny's trademark in Japan to Denny's Japan Ltd.
The consolidated long-term debt of Denny's includes current maturities of $10,596,000.
Denny's called for redemption on Jan. 24, 1985, of all of its outstanding 9112% convertible
subordinated debentures due October 15,2007, at a redemption price of 107.77% of the principal amount thereof plus accrued interest.

SOURCE: Denny's, Inc, Proxy Statement, December 21, 1984.
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"Denny's entered into interest rate swap arrangements to mitigate
the impact on Denny's of increases in borrowing costs resulting from
fluctuations in interest rates."36 Nonetheless, interest payments for
1985 are expected to "exceed $72 million and every one-point rise in
interest rates could cost the company $5 million."37Denny's net income
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1984, was $45 million on revenue
of $1.2 billion. As a result of the buyout, however, interest expenses
on the massive debt would almost eradicate any prospects for increased
earnings and had been expected to retard Denny's aggressive expansion program in 1985. ("Denny's 1984 strategic plan without given
recognition to the LBO estimated the 1985 revenue to be $1.45 billion with net income estimated a t $54 million.")38
It is evident that the investor group that acquired Denny's on a LBO
- not to mention the three primary lenders - stands to incur substantial losses if Denny's LBO does not prove successful. I t should be
noted, however, that it is the belief of many analysts that if everything
goes as planned, profits could pay off most of the principal and interest
within 10 years. In such a case, should the company become highly
profitable again, the resale of Denny's to the public would result in
dramatic returns to the participating management, investors, and Merrill Lynch. Thus, high stakes are involved in Denny's LBO. Still, if the
buyout works according to company's expectations, it might prove to
be extremely rewarding for all concerned.
Denny's Post-LBO Strategy

Analysts had predicted that Denny's would slow its past torrid expansion pace in the aftermath of the LBO to "direct cash flow toward
accelerated debt service."39 Nonetheless, confronted with the prospects
that slower expansion could lead to loss of its coffee shop market dominance, Denny's has "decided to launch a selective program of restaurant f r a n ~ h i s i n g , "thus
~ ~ reversing a company trend that began in 1970
which was adverse to the use of franchising as a method of expansion. By doing so, potential initial franchise fees and continuing sales
royalties could help to service the huge debt resulting from the buyout. Meanwhile, with the advent of the franchising program, the faster
growth rate is likely to continue in spite of the LBO.
Some observers have also pointed out that Denny's 1983 acquisition
of El Pollo Loco division provided "a growth vehicle that may be
brought public on its own, creating an exciting public vehicle if deemed
d e ~ i r a b l e . "But
~ ~ Denny's original "vision for El Pollo Loco becoming
America's pollo chain,"42which accounted for its building up the chain
to more than 35 units in California and Tkxas, may have to be reconsidered. The buyout "has placed enough of a financial strain on the company to raise questions whether it can afford to keep rapidly expanding
El Pollo Loco and whether that would divert critical financing resources
from Denny's restaurants themselves - still Denny's main growth
vehicle."43
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Other LBOs Exist in the Industry

In addition to Denny's LBO there have been other buyouts floating
in the hospitality industry over the past year or so.
ARA Services, Inc, a Philadelphia-based contract feeder, thrilled
shareholders when 70 top executives took the company private in
December 1984 in a LBO deal valued at $882.5 million. ARA's selling
shareholders received $71.75 a share, "a windfall considering ARA's
price before takeover talk began earlier in 1984 was in the mid-$40'~.''~~
As a consequence, the members of management who participated in
the LBO attained "31 percent ownership of the company, putting up
2 percent of the capital and borrowing the rest against ARA's assets."45
Recent reports indicate that ARKS pretax operating earnings for
the quarter ending March 31, 1985 (the first reporting period as a private company), "rose slightly from $39.7 million in the same period
of the previous year."46 Yet "net after-tax profits dropped considerably compared with the $16.2 million of the last year's similar quarter,"47reflecting the substantial interest that ARA was paying on the
buyout debt.
Conversely, a $525 million LBO plan to buy Chicago-based Diversifoods, Inc, operators of the Godfather's Pizza chain and franchised
Burger Kings, was abandoned in 1984. Diversifood's former chief executive officer Don Smith and other top executives attempted to take the
company private in a LBO transaction, but they dropped the offer after
failing to secure financing in the wake of steady declining earnings.
This resulted in the forced resignation of Don Smith as head of Diversifoods.
As part of a refocusing trend among conglomerates (especially grocery product companies), "Ralston Purina signed an agreement to sell
its Foodmaker restaurant subsidiary (operators of Jack-in-the-Box)for
$500 million to a management group led by Foodmaker's president
~~
and chief executive officer Jack Goodall in a LBO t r a n s a ~ t i o n . "However, the LBO plan fell through because the leaders refused to support it due to Foodmaker's declining earnings and unfavorable economic
conditions in the industry. Another conglomerate that is presently planning to sell a number of its restaurant chains is General Mills.
Reports had also surfaced that Howard Johnson chairman G. Michael
Hostage was trying to put together a group to buy the hotel and restaurant chain from its parent company, Imperial Group PLC, through
an
But there are several outside bidders who were also showing interest in acquiring Howard Johnson's.
Another lodging chain that has been considered a likely candidate
for an LBO is Hilton Hotels Corp. Investment banking sources had
been speculating that chairman Barron Hilton may attempt an LBO.
Analysts who followed Hilton have indicated that "a deal to take the
~~
company private in a LBO would not be u n r e a ~ o n a b l e "considering
that the recent rejection of a Hilton casino license request in Atlantic
City might "make Hilton's management more amenable to running
a private company."51
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Also, the anti-takeover provisions which were intended to thwart hostile takeover attempts by outsiders and which were approved by Hilton's shareholders in their annual meeting of May 6, 1985, "would not
impede a board-approved LBO."52 For this reason, the anti-takeover
measures appeared to have laid the groundwork and buy time for
Barron Hilton's management group to structure a possible LBO. For
the present, "analysts believe Barron Hilton intends to take the company private within the next five years through a
They see
the upcoming sale of the Atlantic City casino as "the first step in taking the company private"54 since it would enable Hilton to raise funds
to eventually undertake the buyout.
Conclusion

LBOs have experienced remarkable growth in recent years. I t is easy
to see why buyouts have become so popular. They can be rewarding
for all participants. Equity investors can achieve returns that would
be unavailable elsewhere with comparable risk. Managersentrepreneurs can receive a unique opportunity to expand their business horizons. Selling shareholders are able to liquify assets that would
otherwise be tied up, while receiving a premium for their shares. Similarly, investment bankers and other packagers can receive colossal fees
and a share of earnings.
Due to the substantial risks associated with LBOs, there will be buyouts which do not prove successful. But for those that do, the rewards
could be outstanding for the management team. Moreover, LBOs will
usually result in significant productivity gains for the new private company as well as higher compensation for the owners-managersentrepreneurs.
Opportunities remain for successful LBOs in the hospitality industry, subject to the continuation of a positive environment for them in
the future Yet the proper balance of rewards and risks will be essential in identifying prime targets. At this time, everyone seems to be
watching Denny's and ARA to see if their deals prove successful. Should
that be the case, other suitable candidates among hospitality firms are
likely to follow suit, hoping to benefit from the potential rewards of
LBOs.
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